This paper explores two examples of collective action, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, and the Kurdish movement in Turkey, by focusing on how these movements constructed two particular places, Diyarbakir and Chiapas, after the armed conflict subsided. My first aim is to show how this place-making has affected the discourses and practices of these movements. I argue that place-making is not only about locality or physical setting, but also about constructing a movement and a form of struggle in its own right. My second aim is to discuss the broad outlines of what may be called the "appropriation of space." This refers not only to the spaces of visibility and solidarity opened up by a movement, but also to its chances of acquiring significance within local, national or global spaces of power. I look at how the Kurdish movement has had an impact on democracy in Turkey and compare it with the Zapatista movements local and transnational effects. I do so by relating physical and metaphorical notions of space to several concepts generated by social movement literature. As such, this study intends to contribute to spatial understandings of collective action. It is also likely to indicate various pitfalls and obstacles for emancipatory social movements in the present neoliberal era.
The geographical, cultural and political contexts within which the two z movements have emerged are so far removed from each other that any attempt to compare becomes a complicated feat. My concern here is neither to demonstrate the validity or usefulness of the literature on social movements in studying seemingly disparate movements, nor to put to test various analytical tools designed for comparative politics. My concern, rather, is to contribute to the recent literature on the spatiality of social movements. For I will argue that the movements in question, in spite of their dissimilarities, entertain a specific relation to place and space. They thereby constitute promising venues through which to enhance scholarly reflection on the politics of place/space. Far from pretending to be an exhaustive study of the two movements, then, this paper focuses on how two particular places, Diyarbakir and Chiapas, were constructed by movements that were armed at the beginning, but consecutively turned "civil" or "social," by opening a space for themselves within the respective dominant political frameworks.
One aim of this paper is to see how place-making has affected the discourses and practices of these movements. I suggest that place-making is not only about constructing a physical location that will "host" the movement, or about investing a place with symbolic meaning; it is also (and perhaps more significantly) about generating a resource that builds up the mobilizing capacities of a movement. T h e cases in question point to the significance of place as a political opportunity structure that (re) constructs social movements. Spatial transgressions, furthermore, are forms of resistance in themselves. Place-making is part of the struggle (and undeclared aims) of a movement. As such, it may well be indispensable as far as the declared causes for mobilization are concerned.
A second aim of the paper is to discuss the broad outlines of what I call the "appropriation of space," which refers to the potential of social movements to alter power structures in a given polity, which is itself not necessarily confined to the territory of a nation-state. Acknowledging that spatial and social justice are closely related, I argue that the diffu-m sion of a movement beyond a specific locality (by 'jumping scales"), the ^ extension of networks, and innovations made in movement repertoires 5 are vital for the sustainability of grassroots collective action in the era of ™ neoliberalism. I use "space" mostly in the metaphorical-associative sense < of forging open a space of recognition through which a social movement 0 is capable of triggering durable effects on social and political structures. * As such, the appropriation of space can indeed be considered as the *> cause (and not necessarily the outcome) of the "cognitive liberation" that ™ McAdam takes to be a precondition of mobilization.
2 This is the main axis forming the ground of comparison for my geographically distinct cases. In this paper, I will first engage with some of the relevant theoretical literature on social movements, space and neoliberal transformation. Then, I will present a brief history of the two armed movements that evolved gradually into social ones: the Zapatista movement initiated by the Zapatista National Liberation Army ( E Z L N ) in Mexico, and the Kurdish movement that emerged from the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey. Consequently, I will focus on how two particular places, Diyarbakir and Chiapas, were constructed by these movements. T h e aim here is to show how place-making has affected the discourses and practices of the two movements. Finally, in the fourth part, I will sketch a broad outline of what I call the "appropriation of space" by the Zapatistas and the Kurds. Without pretending to be either exhaustive or conclusive, I will discuss the potential of these movements to democratize power structures in their respective countries. T h e latter are undergoing significant changes in their economic and political structures, owing to what can be called the "neoliberal turn." My discussion of space considers this transformation to be one of the most significant challenges that social movements in the globalizing world are facing.
The spatiality of movements in the neoliberal era Replacing (or at times supplementing and transforming) previous accounts of collective protests, revolts and revolutions based on the ideas £ of deprivation and grievance, social scientists have explored several differ-= > ent paths in the study of social movements over the past thirty years. In z the US, scholars espousing the resource mobilization theory contend that ^ movement mobilization needs to be accounted for by the availability and p employment of such resources as organizational means, funds, elite and £ expert involvement, network formation, and incentives for recruitment £ and participation. 4 Another line of research is based on what has been a called political process theory, which argues that broader political and culz tural structures shape the capacity of movements to mobilize and achieve goals. 5 The lacunae in each of these theories have spurred more synthetic" approaches in the past decade. 6 One point of convergence significant for the purposes of this paper is between the individual and societal dynamics of movement formation. According to Tarrow, for instance, political opportunity structures are "consistent-but not necessarily formal, permanent or national-dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics," while political constraints are "factors-like repression, but also like authorities' capacity to present a solid front to insurgents-that discourage contention." The focus has shifted from this narrowly political approach towards one that incorporates individual mobilizing structures and more general cultural framing. Mobilizing structures or social networks are ties of face-to-face interaction, personal and group allegiances, organizational resources, or spaces of assembly, as well as inter-organizational links in which individual members of a movement are "embedded." As such, networks and opportunities are not mutually exclusive, although there is considerable ambiguity as to whether networks exist prior to the emergence of a movement or are constituted by and through it.
8
T h e more European strand of social movement research has focused less on the mechanisms of mobilization and organization of particular movements than on structural changes in Western societies. It is being m claimed that, instead of the "old" movements' engagement with the po--o litical or with labor and economic issues, "new" movements in complex, 5 industrialized societies centralize around changes in lifestyle, collective " identities, and cultural demands. 9 They deal with "cultural and especially < ethical problems, because the system which is challenged controls not £ only'means of production' but the production of symbolic goods, that is, * of information and images, of culture itself." 1 £ New social movement theories were actually "part of wider efforts to " theorize periodizations of collective action through examining origins,' 'waves,' cycles,' and 'protest repertoires.'" 11 Tilly's notion of repertoire, for instance, refers to shared understandings, memories and culturally determined "agreements" that arise not only from particular historicalstructural dynamics, but also, and more significantly, from social movement activity itself. Repertoire "identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice," 12 although a repertoire of actions "resembles not individual consciousness but a language." 1 Repertoires constrain behavior and choice, but are also depositories of practical know-how. They are constituted through innovation and/or repetition within the lifetime of a social movement. As such, earlier forms of struggle and protest open up spaces for subsequent cycles. Thus, political process theory has come to conceptualize opportunity, not only as an analytical tool to understand the emergence of protest movements, but also the subsequent transformations they undergo during their lifetime. 14 The notions of embeddedness and context-dependency that are explicitly or implicitly present in the above formulations would call for conceptualizing the spatiality of social movements, but place and space have long been relegated to a secondary status by social movement theorists. As Tarrow points out, 9 jiirgen Habermas, "New Social Movements," Telos, no. 49 (1981) Social Research 52, no. 4 (1985) . 10 Alain Touraine, "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements, " Social Research 52, no. 4 (1985) . Indeed, most of the literature "has treated space as an assumed and unz problematized background, not as a constituent aspect of contentious politics that must be conceptualized explicitly and probed systematically."
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Byron Miller has lamented that time has been prioritized in studying social movements, but that the same degree of attention is not directed to "spaces" or "places" of protest: "For the most part, space is viewed as little more than a container for aspatial social processes; there is no recognition that the spatial constitution of mobilization processes affects their operation." 17 T h e dualism between the "social" and the "spatial" has been maintained in studies that treat space as merely another dependent variable that needs to be taken into account. 18 Although the conceptualizing of collective action frames has moved the emphasis of social movement research from "objective" resource availability to the more "discursive" notion of "framing," few researchers "address the place-based framing of movements."
19
Be that as it may, nobody would contest the idea that spatiality makes a critical difference in the sustainability of collective action, or in determining the.outcome of contentious politics. Lefebvre's path-breaking 1974 study has-explored space as a social product that affects practices, thoughts and possibilities of action. 20 Studies on the Paris insurrections of 1848 and 1870-71 have shown that "a place-sensitive perspective on collective behavior" was highly developed in the nineteenth century, and This paper subscribes to the concern animating Bosco's research into the spatiality and relationality of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo-namely, that although we know that different social movement processes (for example, recruitment, mobilization, or continuity) are mediated and negotiated through networks with different spatialities, it remains unclear whether and how the spatial dimensions of different relations in a network may actually affect the development of such social movement processes.
24
It is especially of interest to look into the dynamics of "how spaciality is related to the constraining and enabling dimensions of relationships in a network."
25
For a long time, space was seen as either the recipient or the outcome of social processes. Poletta, for instance, has insisted that the concept of "free spaces" (such as the Black churches in the case of the civil rights movement) be abandoned in favor of the underlying associative ties £ for which it stands as a metaphor. 26 It is the character of associational = > ties that are established or reinforced in physical gathering spaces, she 2 contends. Therefore, the social must be prioritized over the spatial. Al-2 though such metaphorical or relational approaches to space are valuable p for the purposes of this research, as I will argue shortly, physical and £ geographical space is also indispensable for the comprehension of social 2 movements. As Massey has demonstrated, "there are no purely spatial 5 processes, neither are there any non-spatial social processes." T h e acz tive production of space by social processes and movements needs to be taken into consideration, just as much as the active production of movements by physical and geographical space.
In this study, I will use "place" to refer to a geographic location and to material forms constructed by everyday social practices in that location. 28 These are invested with meaning and value, which accounts for their being identified as places:
[Place] stabilizes and gives durability to social structural categories, differences and hierarchies; arranges patterns of face-to-face interaction that constitute network-formation and collective action; embodies and secures otherwise intangible cultural norms, identities, memories-and values [...] These consequences result uniquely (but incompletely) from material forms assembled at a particular spot, in part via the meanings that people invest in a place.
29
Place, then, is likely to have a significant impact on the structure of the movement itself. A social movement is not only constituted by the motivations and/or limitations of its actors, but also by the ways in which it interacts with and is marked by place. Most significantly, the Madres example has prompted Bosco to evoke bell hooks' concept of'homeplace" of resistance in order to argue that place-based collective rituals-the rootedness and frequent practice of activities in particular places of symbolic importance for a group-play a role in the sustainability of activism and of a shared collective g identity even among members of geographically extensive networks -° of activists. This idea, I will argue, sheds considerable light on the cases of Diyarbakir < and Chiapas and permits interesting comparisons between the two. £ "Space" is an analytical concept that I distinguish from place, de-* spite opposition by geographers. In the way I use it, space is related to » the broader field in which the social movement operates. I use it in the " metaphorical sense, in that space "carves out'room to move,' the space in which to be fecund, dialectical, life-giving."
31 Appropriating space means gaining a foothold within a given social imaginary. It is a space of visibility, in Melucci's sense/'an intermediate public space, whose function is not to institutionalize the movements nor to transform them into parties, but to make society hear their messages and translate these messages into political decision making, while the movements maintain their autonomy." Going even further, I use the term to refer to the capacity of a social or political movement to become a conditioning factor-that is, to leave symbolic or institutional traces on social processes beyond its particular place of action. As such, Nelson's concept of "sedimentation" is useful for my conceptualization. Sedimentation processes refer to the ways in which the discourses and practices initiated by a movement continue to institutionalize, even after the latter has worn out. As defined by Nelson, [sedimentation] refers to the complex processes through which discourses (including 'identities,' political vocabularies, and practices) deployed in moments of collective organization and protest become translated and socially embedded by a variety of actors, not only over time but through disparate social and political arenas."
33
This also introduces a temporal dimension into the study of spatiality, a dimension that may surpass the life-span of the movement itself. T h e movement is thereby de-centered. T h e ripple effects that it creates among its declared supporters and among unexpected circles (includ- £ ing hostile groups) get considerable attention when analyzing the overall = > transformative influence of the movement. To this end, it is necessary to * look into how collective action prompted by a movement affects the lives 2 and practices of communities directly or indirectly related to the movep ment in various ways. £ I have explored elsewhere the discomforting idea that conflict may 2 render a movement, a cause, or an identity visible by forcefully inserting 5 it into the dominant public space. 34 For without the appearance of cons' flicts and identities, differences, commonalities and power structures to heterogeneous publics, neither the designation of a given problem as a common problem that prompts action, nor proper "commun-ication" (rendering common) is possible. Publicity is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for creating a mobilizing bond that alters or reshapes power structures. Put differently, spatial transgressions can be considered disruptions of the taken-for-granted organization of social (and political) space. 35 Likewise/jumping scales" 36 is not only one of the ways in which a social movement expands and gains staying power, but also a transgression or modification by the movement of the set of political alternatives available to the polity in which it emerges. However, something should be said about the temporal horizon in which these two movements maintain their existence. As Harvey has so convincingly pointed out, in most parts of the world spaces and places are increasingly shaped by the dynamics of neoliberalism. Loss of place as "mobility," "displacement," and "deterritorialization" become the paradigmatic figures of our times. 38 T h e problem is aggravated by how global neoliberalism disturbs spaces of possible interest aggregation, other than those serving the new regime of capital accumulation. It is certainly paradoxical that the proliferation of what is called identity politics coincides with the forceful alteration of modes of production and accumulation. As Harvey has pointed out, acceleration in turnover times of capital, the turn to the provision of ephemeral services, and the process of flexible accumulation have led to a "rapid write-off of tradi-™ tional and historically acquired values." 39 In fact, the fragmentation of •» formerly unified (and thereby normalizing) social struggles is partially 5 responsible for the growing inability of alternative groups to occupy any n ground in both the physical and the relational sense. In a world con-< nected through hegemonic discourses that tend to erase the conditions £ that make it possible to sustain democratic grassroots activity, the capac-* ity of a social movement to hold enough ground in order to become a » conditioning factor is a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed. ™ Seizing or opening up a space of existence bestows a tangible reality on a political community, stabilizes the power generated by collective action, and institutes the conditions of remembrance. It was Lefebvre's insight that any '"social existence' aspiring or claiming to be 'real,' but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the cultural' realm."
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Seen in this manner, place-making and the appropriation of space both provide entry points from which to link movements in different geographies. By combining along these lines insights obtained from research on space and on social movements, I will assess my two cases, without singling out a particular paradigm or conceptual framework, but instead attempting to show the complexity and interrelatedness of such elements as opportunity structure, repertoire, network, place, space, and scale.
Two geographically distant cases of forceful insertion
Both the P K K and the E Z L N are armed guerilla groups that have set off a variety of pacific forces no longer under their direct control. W h a t is of interest for the purposes of this paper is how a social movement has emerged from an armed one.
Although the common tendency in Kurdish studies is to focus on the P K K as the mastermind and main impetus behind the Kurdish movement in Turkey, I find this approach lacking, for at least three important reasons: (1) T h e long and tortuous path that first brought legalization in 1990 and then, from 1999 onwards, a degree of legitimacy to Kurdish political parties inevitably drove the latter into a course that no longer 39 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 290. 40 This is where the distinction between being in the world and being o/the world becomes most evident.
Cf. Jacques Taminiaux £ fully coincides with that of the PKK. (2) Victories won by legal Kurdish = > parties in municipal elections in the southeastern provinces from 1999 z onwards have initiated local discourses and practices that no longer fully 2 overlap with the PKK's broader national/transnational concerns and p claims. Thus, the political and social opportunity structures can be said £ to have changed for the Kurdish movement as a whole. (3) T h e bonds 2 and alliances that Kurdish political leaders have formed over the past s few years with Turkish intellectuals, artists, academics and activists are z not spurred by the P K K ; rather, they are attempts to disarm the P K K by bringing about the conditions necessary for peace and reconciliation. It can thus be argued that the Kurdish movement's network formation process is not necessarily the same as the PKK's.
As a guerilla force with a vindictive ideological agenda and a strong personality cult, the P K K has been ineffective in adapting itself to domestic and global changes during the span of its thirty-year existence. It has secured considerable grassroots support through indoctrination and/or cashing in on the various forms of repression and violence that the state as well as tribal life inflicts on Kurds, mainly in southeastern Turkey. Attempts to diversify and multiply the Kurdish movement through workers' unions, civic associations, cultural centers, visual and print media and through a series of political parties formed from 1990 onwards (HEP, O Z D E P , DEP, H A D E P , D E H A P and D T P ) have often stumbled over the PKK's hard-line strategies as well as the Turkish establishment's intolerance. Nevertheless, especially after the 1999 municipal victories, Kurdish parties were able to develop extensive relations with constituencies and civic organizations. Despite continuing pressures from both the PKK's central command and the Turkish establishment, the latter came to have a life of their own, although they do at times seem to lead a double life. In my view, what has turned a militaristic stance into a social movement are the networks constituted around legal Kurdish groups.
T h e P K K started out as a handful of determined Marxists gathering around the charismatic figure of Abdullah Ocalan in the late 1970s. Embracing a Marxist-Leninist ideology and holding the conviction that an independent nation-state was the only way to put an end to the re-• pression and denial of Kurdish identity in the Turkish Republic, it opted for violent tactics at the onset. After the party program was drawn in 1978, the PKK's first attack was on a local deputy and large landowner in Sanhurfa. T h e 1980 military coup in Turkey caused it to move to the g Bekaa Valley in Lebanon in order to train and consolidate its structure, -o In 1984, a year after the military junta stepped back into the barracks, * the P K K re-launched itself in Turkey by raiding two army outposts in n the Southeast. T h e Turkish state retaliated by declaring a State of Emer-< gency in eleven southeastern provinces in 1987, recruiting and arming £ Kurdish peasants to serve as village guards and sending thousands of * well-equipped troops to the region, in order to conduct massive opera-= tions in mountain hide-outs as well as in, villages and cities. This led to < a gradual swelling of P K K ranks, as victims of the arbitrary treatment and brutal conduct of the village guards and rank-and-file army took to the mountains in reaction. By 1993, Ocalan was claiming that he had 30,000 guerillas under his command. This was also the period during which major popular uprisings and rioting called serhildans (the Kurdish word corresponding to the Palestinian intifada) took place in several cities. T h e Turkish army's scorched earth strategy was backfiring.
Meanwhile, the first legal Kurdish party, HEP, was formed in 1990. This was both a new turn and the beginning of the decline of the armed movement. Tactical mistakes by the H E P (such as taking the parliamentary oath in Kurdish) and the establishment's unswerving intent on using every means to crush the movement finally resulted in a military and political victory over the PKK. The reformist wing of the newly formed K O N G R A -G E L (this was the P K K after having undergone a name change) avowed that
[the] number of guerrillas, which was 13,000 in 1993, had fallen to 8,500 in 1998. In other words, the reduction was 40 per cent [...] T h e growth of the guerrilla had stopped; the percentage of recruitment was not enough to meet half of the losses. T h e political [serhildans] had been reduced to some events on specific annual days.
44
T h e P K K fell into quasi total disarray upon the capture of Ocalan in 1999. 45 The P K K did not allow for any Kurdish movement other than itself to emerge in Turkey in the post-1980 period. Groups or intellectuals who attempted to form an alternative organization were either silenced or killed.
46 O n the other hand, the Turkish establishment was so sus- 47 Between two ideologies that * paradoxically mirrored one another, almost no space was left for non-12 antagonistic discourses. This can be grasped through the plight of the p legal Kurdish parties in Turkey. H E P was formed by Kurdish deputies £ expelled from the ranks of the social democrat SHP. A year later, H E P 2 and S H P entered into an electoral alliance which gave H E P the chance s to overcome the 10-percent national electoral threshold and to place 22 z deputies in parliament. But the establishment found endless reasons to ban the party. Through a name-change maneuver, H E P retained its deputies, by becoming first O Z D E P and then DEP. But such pressures also led to the radicalization of the party. As Barkey has observed,
[wjhereas H E P was a Kurdish party in essence, it made an effort to appeal beyond the ethnic dimension and had symbolically selected a Turk as its first president. DEP, by contrast, following the failure of the 1993 PKK-initiated cease-fire, became increasingly more strident and willing to take chances with the establishment.
49
Thus caught in the mirror effect between the two main protagonists of the Kurdish problem, the D E P was also banned and its leaders imprisoned or forced into exile. It was only with the simultaneous retreat of the two antagonistic hegemonic forces (the P K K and the Turkish military) that an alternative space could finally be constructed. That space owed its existence to the capture of Ocalan in 1999 and the signing of the Helsinki Agreement between Turkey and the E U in the same year. Through the agreement, Ankara made a number of democratic commitments in view of full membership and conceded to be closely inspected by the E U in regard to its human rights record. This was indeed a significant change in the political opportunity structure available to the Kurdish movement in Turkey.
A similar occurrence can also be observed in Chiapas. T h e E Z L N ' s war on the Mexican government coincided with the entry into force of the N A F T A agreement between Mexico, the US, and Canada. This was not planned from the outset; the date was chosen because the E Z L N ™ could not complete its military preparations earlier. 50 But the coinci-•» dence proved to be rewarding since it obliged the Mexican government £ to agree to negotiate with the rebels only twelve days after the armed n uprising. T h e government did not want to lose its marketing image with < its northern neighbors. This is as much the reason why the Chiapas re-£ bellion could rapidly enter a new phase to construct an alternative space. * T h e question of whether the Clandestine Committee's energetic appeal » to civil society in Mexico and elsewhere over the internet could have ™ saved the E Z L N from being crushed by the Mexican army's tanks and heavy weaponry had there not been this critical moment during which the government was worrying about its image, is a question left unanswered. Likewise, then, the E Z L N thrust itself into the public limelight at a time when political opportunity structures were changing.
' T h e E Z L N was actually a branch of the F L N founded by radical Marxist students in the 1970s. W h e n a small group of would-be guerillas decided to take residence in the Lacandon jungle to try to organize a rebellion there in 1984, they did not have the means-that is, the language, the population's confidence of the population, and so o n -t o begin to communicate with indigenous people. This part of the story of the E Z L N is still understudied, despite its enormous significance. T h e same can be said of the PKK's story. H o w did the rebel groups make their first contacts? W h a t discourses did they construct or employ to mobilize the local population? W h a t barriers did they face during the mobilization process? For instance, the P K K had to moderate its discourse against religion in the 1990s, because of "the recognition of the defeat of the Marxist teachings in the region[,] the P K K had to rely on Islamic inspiration to get public support for its activities." 51 Likewise, the E Z L N had to readjust its Marxist and vanguard rhetoric. T h e guerillas first had to make themselves useful in the communities and only then could begin to mobilize them through a great deal of indoctrination. Ankara Papers 9, no. 1 (2004): 31. 52 As a hierarchical organization that only accepted a single philosophy, the PKK relied more heavily on ideological education and military training. See Ozcan, "The Vacillating PKK," esp. 31-32. But to attribute the organization's relatively significant success in augmenting its ranks to its supposed tactics of "terrorizing the people into supporting the organization" ("The Case of the PKK," 36) would be a biased assessment. No study has been undertaken on why ordinary peasants joined the PKK's ranks. Pending such evidence, however, it is not possible to make an off-hand judgment.
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005379 £ The Zapatista war lasted a very brief twelve days. One of the rea-= sons why the PKK's war had to last a full fifteen years before any al-* ternative space could be constructed is that both the Turkish economy 2 and Ankara's international relations could sustain themselves against all p odds. 5 3 In 1984, when the war started, Turkey was isolated from the in-£ ternational community because of its military coup. T h e military junta 2 cleared the way for a rapid transition to a liberal market economy. T h e s economy consequently boomed and attained G D P growth as high as an z eightpercent annually. Such a dynamic market became more and more attractive to foreign investors who, despite the ongoing war in the southeast (or maybe even because of it), began investing heavily in Turkey. Government bonds sold in international markets were also a source of attraction to investors. Briefly put, despite verbal pressure from the European Union as to its human rights record, neither business elites nor politicians felt the need to modify the hard-line approach in dealing with the Kurdish question. With the exception of some efforts attributed to the late President Turgut Ozal , no high-ranking Turkish politician regarded negotiating with the P K K a viable option to end the war.
In contrast, the Mexican government immediately had to negotiate with the E Z L N . T h e prospect of endangering the benefits expected to accrue from N A C L A was too risky. Mexican and international civil society also constituted a factor to be dealt with at the onset. T h e political opportunities available to the E Z L N were thus much more favorable.
A similarity must be noted, however: Both armed uprisings forced the plight of the Kurds and that of the indigenous people in Chiapas into the limelight in a dramatic fashion. The spokesperson of the E Z L N , Subcommandante Marcos, succinctly describes the indigenous uprising as a form of "dying in order to live." 54 Likewise, the prominent Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal admits:
In Turkey, neither journalists nor the press fulfilled their duties with respect to the Kurdish or the Southeastern problem. T h e number of those who did remained low. I admit it. As a graduate of political science, I did not know what the Kurdish problem was. It was only when the P K K entered the political scene that I started to learn.
53 Another reason is, o f course, the fact that the PKK has resorted to terrorist tactics against civilians, whereas the EZLN has not. This avowal, along with Marcos's tragic statement, tells us a lot about <* how power structures operated in both countries prior to the uprisings, -o The Kurds were not "relegated to oblivion," like the indigenous popu-" lations in Mexico, but they were constantly considered suspicious ele-n ments that could only stop being a threat to the unity of the nation by < being assimilated. 56 T h e indigenous in Mexico, meanwhile, were treated £ as qwasi-serfs, even though Mexican national identity used Maya sym-* bols to re-invent the mythical ancestral roots of the Mexican republic. £ W h a t needs to be noted here is that the armed uprisings in both " countries served to force open a space of recognition. In Turkey, the effect was more gradual, since the PKK's initial operations were discursively identified by the establishment as isolated instances of terrorism by a handful of fanatic separatists. It was only when a state of emergency was declared in the Southeast in 1987 and the uprising took a massive turn with the serhildans in 1990 that the term "the Kurdish problem" entered into circulation in the public sphere. This finally gave the Kurdish uprising an "event character," an attribute that the 1994 Zapatista takeover of four cities in Chiapas immediately acquired.
The E Z L N imposed itself on the Mexican government in a similar vein. T h e willingly spectacular seizure of a place, the city of San Cristobal de las Casas, and the subsequent usage of the internet to convey the Zapatista message to national and international publics constituted a rupture that had to be faced by state officials. 57 Neither the dominant media, nor political rhetoric could employ customary tactics to render the uprisings invisible, insignificant or radically evil. Another similarity must be noted. The event character of the uprisings had paradoxical consequences: (1) both uprisings were able to attain a huge amount of publicity, arousing the attention of the political establishment, the media, civil society and scholars; and (2) in both cases, the preparatory phase that came before the event and the reconstruction phase that came after it were relegated to secondary status because of the spectacle itself. In other words, the event can be said to have overshadowed the less spectacular aspects of the movement. This is evident especially in Turkey where scholars pay scant attention to the current Kurdish party DTP, or to organizations that prioritize the Kurdish issue in their internal regulations or activist agenda, £ such as the Education Workers' Union (Egitim-Sen), the H u m a n Rights = > Association ( I H D ) , the newspaper Ozgur Gundetn, and women's assoz ciations such as Selis. These are considered to be manipulated by the « PKK. It may be true that the P K K directly or indirectly controls or p influences some of the pro-Kurdish organizations operating within the £ political and social field in Turkey to a certain degree. But Barkey has 2 drawn attention to the fact that Kurdish parties "never developed, con-9 trary to the government's claims, the kind of organic relationship which z exists between the IRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, where the latter does not hide the fact that it is the political arm of the armed militants." 58 Thus, the "sedimentation" of discourses and practices instigated by the forceful insertion of Kurdish identity into a homogenized national imaginary cannot be overlooked without paying the price of producing incomplete, biased and faulty analysis.
T h e early 1990s is the period in which the Kurdish "micro-space" that had emerged in the 1960s in Turkey's southeastern provinces became "firmly rooted in the Turkish political arena." 59 This marked the opening of differential political and social spaces within the territory of the nation-state. N o t only had the Kurdish war become a constant item on the country's agenda, but successive Kurdish parties were also scoring unusually high in the southeastern provinces in general elections. H A -DEP, the third legal Kurdish party after H E P and DEP, for instance, obtained only 4.2 percent of the nation-wide vote, but scored as high as 46.7 percent in Diyarbakir, 37.4 percent in Van, and 54.3 percent in Hakkari in 1995. 6 0 This amounted to about a million votes which, as
Barkey has rightly observed, conferred some degree of legitimacy to the party. 61 N o other mainstream party could equal this performance in cities considered to be the main bastions of Kurdish nationalism. Thus, two different electoral dynamics began operating in the country, one national and the other regional. In the March 2009 local elections, for instance, although the D T P obtained only 5.68 percent of the national vote, it won the mayor's seat in one metropolitan city (Diyarbakir) and seven provincial capitals in the Kurdish region. In Hakkari, it scored as high as 78.97 percent. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) had poured significant resources into competing with the D T P in the eastern and southeastern provinces, especially for the Diyarbakir metropolitan municipality, in order to capture this "Kurdish bastion"; 6i instead, it ended up losing even the municipalities that it had previously <* held. 62 T h e Kurdish provinces, then, were behaving and reacting dif-•» ferently from the rest of the country. This Kurdish "micro-space" owed 5 much to the spectacularity of the heightened war and the serhildans. n These were literal incisions into a national public space that had been < regimented by the 1980 putsch. 63 Although the Turkish establishment £ was not yielding to demands for recognition, a de facto recognition was * already taking place. The PKK, Kurdish legal parties, and the Kurdish » constituency in the Southeast had become part and parcel of politics ™ in Turkey. They had become factors to be dealt with, to be struggled against during elections, to be taken into account when drafting party programs, and so forth.
Chiapas did not become a "micro-space" in the electoral sense, since the Zapatistas boycott representative democratic mechanisms. It became an autonomous zone no longer controlled by the central government, however. T h e visitor to the region is stunned by the presence of an informal border: the Zapatista flag is stretched across the wall of the first village house, and a sign post reads: "Zapatista Village. It is forbidden to introduce alcoholic beverages, drugs and other illicit articlesCommittee of Good Government." This is not a simple enclave detached from the rest of the country. The Zapatistas intend for it to be a model of self-government to be imitated elsewhere in Mexico and in the world. More importantly, the language of indigenous rights has started circulating in Mexico, owing to the Zapatista prowess in bringing the government to sign an accord, as will be elaborated on below.
Yet, the unspectacular struggle to build alternative political, economic, educational, sanitary and judicial structures in Chiapas does not seem capable of prompting as much publicity as, say, the question of the real identity of Subcommandante Marcos. Moreover, neither movement overturned the regime against which it was fighting. However, the impact of both movements on discourses and practices beyond their immediate circles cannot be evaluated without considering the aftermath of the uprisings. After having inserted themselves into the authoritarian political spaces in their respective countries, the two movements were able to establish extensive networks and thereby j u m p scales, each in its own particular manner, thanks to the places that they built as strongholds-namely, Diyarbakir and Chiapas. £ Two different dynamics of place-making = As stated at the outset, what I call "place-making" provides a convenient z framework through which the less visible or discernable effects of a so-2 cial movement on societal processes may be studied. T h e "complex prop cesses through which discourses [...] deployed in moments of collective £ organization and protest become translated and socially embedded by 2 a variety of actors, not only over time but through disparate social and s political arenas" 64 followed a comparable logic in Mexico and Turkey.
z After the capture of Ocalan, the main institutional structures of the Kurdish movement were the 38 municipalities obtained by H A D E P in the 1999 local elections, eight of which were metropolitan.
65 I have argued elsewhere that the impact of this electoral victory was not political in the narrow sense of the word, but mainly cultural and social.
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Particularly in Diyarbakir, the municipality became the force that moved the city out of its devastated and sinister existence after fifteen years of a "low-intensity war." Without the institutional weight of the municipality as a counter-force against the central state institutions in the city, the transformation could not have been as impressive. I will briefly outline this transformation, since it demonstrates how place-making is not only about appropriating a physical place, but also about (re)constructing a movement. Diyarbakir severely suffered under the State of Emergency declared in 1987. Public activity was restricted by strict curfews and surveillance. Hundreds succumbed to "extrajudicial executions" that were sometimes carried out in broad daylight. T h e forced evacuation of villages in the region had tripled the size of the city's population; infrastructure and sewage systems fell drastically short of serving the population's needs. Unemployment rose to as much as 60 percent in the winter when no seasonal work was available in other regions. These material difficulties worsened the trauma of war and loss.
67 Evidently, the government was not inclined to provide any financial or social aid. T h e first H A D E P mayor had to seek funds from the EU to invest in much-needed infrastructure. It became the first public institution since 1980 to tend to such basic needs as garbage collection or the provision of clean water in the city. T h e municipality thus contributed to the (re)constitution of the istration to heed local demands. ™ T h e municipality also used its legitimacy to boost various social and < civic actors that had been trying to open up niches for themselves in £ the polarized public space. It enabled the local youth to form theater or * music groups; it inaugurated a festival that brought local and national » artists together; it used shrewd tactics to dodge the ban on celebrating " Newroz, the Kurdish New Year, and actually turned the event into a festivity attracting popular Turkish singers and hundreds of thousands of spectators. It invited social and cultural associations from other regions in Turkey to propose projects to deal with the city's multiple needs (such as dealing with homeless children), or encouraged those who wanted to set up their own private institutions (such was the case of the now fully established Diyarbakir Cultural Center).
In fact, the 2000 Newroz celebrations disturbed the chain of significations that split Turkey's symbolic space into two. Instead of functioning as a signifier that constituted and reinforced the frontiers of the two camps (pro-state and pro-Kurdish), Newroz became the ground for a mutual struggle-for recognition on the part of the Kurdish movement and for hegemony on the part of the state. This altered the symbolic value of Newroz for both Kurds and Turks. Although still representing Kurdish cultural identity for the Kurdish movement, it became a festivity instead of a site of violent antagonism. As for the Turkish public, Newroz no longer retained its threatening connotations and began to be celebrated as well, albeit in physical places apart from the Kurds.
On a more physical level, the next Kurdish mayor of the D E H A P (the party's name had changed in between) engaged in the city's decolonization. T h e re-investment of the city as a place with a new imaginary was facilitated by the 1995 initiative of a civil society organization to mobilize several public institutions around a project to restore the ancient city walls.
68 By 2003, the walls were the central elements of a campaign to get Diyarbakir listed under the Seven Wonders of Anatolia Contest sponsored by a private entrepreneur. T h e walls came to represent a history that went unacknowledged in Turkish nationalist discourse and historiography. T h e consecration of the ancient walls thus had the double effect of constructing local pride as well as transcending it. The confines of the local and the particular were transcended in £ such a way as to articulate Kurdishness into world cultural heritage (the = > universal or the global). I have also dealt with this elsewhere. Suffice z it here to note that the Turkish Republic was quite successful in effac-« ing the traces of the "Other" in the eastern and southeastern provinces -where Armenians, Kurds, Syriacs, Arabs and other ethnies had lived for £ centuries. 70 Diyarbakir was one of the privileged targets of such erasure * strategies, since the first Kurdish rebellion in the history of the Republic j had taken place there in 1925. The recent renegotiation of Diyarbakir's z culture and history constructed a foothold on Turkish territory for a Kurdish identity that now imagined itself through its cultural heritage rather than its armed uprising. The city thus became the informal Kurdish capital and was invested with new meaning.
These and other details, the enumeration of which is redundant here, show how the materialization of a new discourse of social, cultural and urban needs became the nodal point marking the dispersion of former antagonisms in favor of a more fluid constellation of forces. This placemaking also had an impact on the subsequent evolution of the Kurdish movement. As I shall show below, not only did this modify the set of actors within the movement, but it also changed its discourse. T h e spatial transgression that eventually turned Diyarbakir into a "Kurdish bastion" was not an incidental feature in the emergence of a wider social movement, it was part and parcel of the construction of practices of resistance. Diyarbakir, when invested with symbolic meaning, became a mobilizing factor, much in the way of the Plaza de Mayo. This demonstrates indeed that the "symbolism of a particular place can be 'mobile."
Events followed a different course in Chiapas. W h a t happened there points to another dynamic, a rural one in this case. As opposed to the urban needs and structures to which the Kurdish movement was responding, 72 the zones controlled by the Zapatistas in Chiapas were populated by severely impoverished peasants whose needs were much more basic and vital. Chiapas is one of Mexico's poorest states. As is true of Turkey's Southeast, it suffers from neglect, willful devastation and rampant corruption. But the E Z L N did not aim to found a separate m state, as did the PKK, The Zapatistas requested that the indigenous •« be granted official recognition, that their rights be guaranteed by law, 5 and that their living conditions be improved. Yet, they linked the issue n of indigenous rights to two other concerns from the very start: to the < indigenous communities' right to self-determination, and to the struggle £ against neoliberalism. In other words, their aim was to simultaneously * bring the indigenous out of oblivion, stop multinationals from devas-» tating Mexico's resources, and obtain official recognition for a form of ™ political organization that the indigenous had been using for centuries. The first phase of the uprising ended in February of 1996 with the signing of the San Andres Accords, actually only a small portion of what the Zapatistas had proposed at the beginning of the talks. T h e accords, in fact, were intended to recognize cultural and ethnic pluralism in Mexico, but in a way that linked this issue to the indigenous communities' right to self-determination. The government pledged to incorporate these rights into the constitution. It also promised to take measures to enhance the political representation of the indigenous, provide for their participation in the judicial system, recognize their customary systems of justice [usos y costumbres), and provide for the sustainability of the communities. By the end of the year, President Ernesto Zedillo had already betrayed the E Z L N . It then became clear to the Zapatistas that the only solution to implementing the San Andres Accords was to implement them on their own/right here and now," without depending on the federal administration's good will (which they proved not to have).
T h e second to fourth phases of the uprising thus took the form of the establishment of autonomy in the 38 municipalities that the Z a patistas controlled. Phase two saw the formation of the five coordinating centers called Aguascalientes and the pooling of resources through a community labor tax. T h e government's official representatives and authorities were expelled in the third phase. Starting in July of 2003, the fourth phase launched a regional structure of autonomous government: "Each autonomous municipality now sends rotating representatives to one of the five regional These structures, renamed Caracoles (conches in Spanish), physically stand in the middle of the Zapatista communities. To simplify this somewhat, the social and political order functions according to a horizontal network of villages that are then linked vertically via a system of delegation (but not representation) at three different levels: that of the municipio, the region, and the caracol. The caracol is both the meeting place for the communities and the seat of the autonomous governments. Because most Zapatista communities are rural, the caracoles are situated at convenient distances from the pueblos grouped under them. They have all been added to the landscape, rather than being constructed out of already existing residential structures. They all contain similar buildings and facilities, such as an auditorium, a clinic, a school, and administrative offices. People from different villages come together here to sit in assemblies that discuss communal needs and devise solutions. T h e conch is thus physically porous: it is not inhabited by anyone, but this is where community power is wielded. Unlike a municipality or govern- 77 There was, in fact, a mutual dependence between the guerillas and the indigenous populations. T h e guerillas did not trust the indigenous for fear of being denounced, but needed them in order to survive in the jungle and also in order to set up an army. T h e indigenous did not trust the guerillas for fear of being dragged into a rank-and-file guerilla army, but needed them in order to learn how to defend themselves against government raids and paramilitary activity. "In order to survive, we had to translate ourselves using a different code [...] this language constructed itself from the bottom upwards," writes Marcos, adding that the indigenous "have a different substratum, a complex prehistory of uprisings, so we modified our approach interactively." 78 This is how the E Z L N slowly gave birth to the social movement that calls itself "Zapatista," and the conch was devised to symbolize autonomy as well as the absence of leadership.
W h a t needs to be emphasized first and foremost is the type of power that the Zapatistas constructed in the territories that they had retracted from the grip of the state-party, the PRI. By refusing to make claims on federal state power, the Zapatistas were actually eschewing political forms thought to be inescapable. Alternative structures were set up during the initial phase of negotiation between the armed intellectuals that were out to revolutionize Mexico and the indigenous populations inhabiting the Chiapas for centuries. T h e place for politics that emerged in the decade-long creation (1984-94) of a common understanding and a common strategy is characterized by structures that contain the promise of be ; ng anti-structures. To be sure, the Zapatistas have set up an order; they are in no way anarchists in that sense. But what is peculiar about this order is that it necessarily allows for indeterminacy, owing to its very £ structure. Given the imperatives of capital and its historical (and consti-= tutive) relation to the modern state, the place produced by the Zapatistas z works as a potential antidote to the formation of hegemonies or patterns £ of domination. T h e particular organizational form of the councils-the p rejection of representative democracy or party politics, the multiplication £ of venues of participation, the deprofessionalization of administrative * tasks-breaks with the kind of political structure in which capitalism 3 has historically thrived. As such, place becomes the means of struggle, z an active force determining the form that the resistance will take, just as much as place-making becomes the object of struggle. To put it differently, place is a means as well as an aim, a constituting force as well as a constituted one.
This actually accounts for the staying power of the Zapatistas: thirteen years have elapsed since the initial uprising. A form of organization of all spheres of life has been found that continually instigates reflection concerning the community at large while allowing for individuation. T h e articulation of places (the pueblos) to the whole area of Chiapas as controlled by the Zapatistas is such that a constant flow of communication can be secured. This structure not only enables the confrontation of individual demands with communal ones, thus allowing negotiation to take place between the two, but also produces subjectivities that become fine-tuned to the linkages between scales. From building a bridge to determining what courses will be taught in community schools, decisions are taken together in assemblies. 79 Questions exceeding the capacity of the pueblos are referred to higher units, but ultimately the pueblo has the right to accept or reject the final decisions made at these levels. Alternative economic solutions have been devised that allow for a pooling of resources, which preserves the right of individuals to land, resources and consumption, while catering to the common good.
T h e places that were modified by the Zapatista movement did not carry the traits of the more centralized, compact and architecturally visible urban model of change seen in Diyarbakir. 80 Rather, they were modified because of their being incorporated into a new structure of <« autonomous administration. Daily life in the pueblos is linked to an ex-T> panding spiral (much like the metaphor of the conch) of lives within 5 and beyond the community. In other words, constructing a place-that n of Zapatista autonomy-in Chiapas is an integral part of the Zapatista < movement. £ But, as much as place-making in a field of hostile forces is a clear sign * of the strength and vigor of a movement, as Stahler-Stolk has rightly £ pointed out, there are a number of pitfalls related to the model of auton-" omy. Among these is the danger of regional "bossism," of being trapped in a "self-policed homeland" with limited resources; of "the potential for the neoliberal state to pass off responsibility for the unprofitable provision of public goods to'autonomous,' but underfunded units"; of the creation of "new mechanisms for division and cooptation" and of "managed neoliberal multiculturalism"-that is, o f t h e neoliberal model's recognition of a plurality of indigenous identities, as long as those identities do not become the basis for collective organization around substantive rights."
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O n another note, the Zapatistas' capacity for maneuvering in the Mexican domestic arena is curbed by two factors: (1) All negotiations with the government or strategic moves are debated in assemblies before being implemented. This also accounts for why the war ended in twelve days: the indigenous communities decided that enough blood was shed.
(2) Catering to the needs of the communities takes up an enormous amount of time and energy and thus turns Zapatista ingenuity inwards rather than outwards.
It is therefore important to assess the broader effects that the two movements have had beyond the places which they had reinvested with a new identity and relationship structure. O f particular interest for the purposes of this paper is how the two movements managed to 'jump scale," thus extending their networks beyond their particular locality. In strict correlation stands the question of innovation, change and disruption in the repertoire of action and symbolism available to the movements. This is particularly relevant if we accept that national security discourses, coupled with global neoliberal assaults on previously uncommodified assets and resources, have dealt a blow to individual and group rights. It may well be that democratization is no longer tantamount to institutional arrangements at the national level. Market forces serve to dispossess citizenry not only through aggressive accumulation process- 5 At this point, assessment is not an unproblematic task and needs to be 9 nuanced. Neither the historical and cultural context within which the z two movements have emerged, nor the power structures against which they have had to struggle allow for easy comparison. For the purposes of this paper, which is avowedly limited in scope, I will content myself with making a few remarks concerning certain visible signs of network formation and "sedimentation."
The Kurdish/democratization movement
The Kurdish uprising turned "national" with the foundation of legal parties and organizations. W h e n the war subsided and the prospect of joining the EU created an atmosphere of euphoria receptive to democratic demands, the Kurdish movement expanded considerably to include nonKurds, a sizeable portion of the Left, the Turkish intelligentsia and civil society activists. Meanwhile, torture victims and the victims of forced evacuations were forming associations to express their grievances and demands. Such activities were particularly important as they appealed to the general Turkish public. The privatization of television broadcasting and the creation of the pro-Kurdish Med T V have also been influential. 82 Through satellite broadcasting, Med T V (now renamed Roj T V ) managed to open up a space in which Kurdish culture and politics could find a non-official medium of expression. All this has significantly altered the field of civic activism as well as its actors. Most important of all was the rapprochement enabled by the Kurdish municipalities between leaders of the Kurdish movement and democracy activists elsewhere in Turkey. Diyarbakir was where these started to meet each other, sit on panels and consider cooperating around concrete social projects. As suggested above, place-making played a key role in network construction. Before anybody else from the Kurdish movement, the D E H A P metropolitan mayor of the city, Osman Baydemir, began to receive invitations to Istanbul from formal or informal activist circles. Baydemir s discourse differed both from that of the national leaders of D E H A P and from that of the PKK. Ever since his election to office, he called for the establishment of the conditions necessary for Turks and Kurds to live together peacefully. Despite his being constantly stigmatized by the dominant media, Baydemir also made the first moves in the way of investing the mayor's office with new functions. Under his initiative, for instance, nine D E H A P mayors proposed a"Fraternity Law" as an alternative to the state's "Amnesty Law" to P K K militants who have not yet laid down their arms.
8 3 In doing so, the mayors were not only acting as popularly elected representatives of their constituencies, but also as if they were deputies from the party at the national level. Indeed, the Diyarbakir mayor went on a tour of several European capitals before the 17 December 2004 EU summit in which Turkey's capacity to fully adhere to the EU's criteria was evaluated. H e pleaded in favor of Turkey's adherence. Without doubt, this was a step out of everyday biopolitics to link the local to national and international levels. More importantly, the mayors were moving beyond the available political structures and repertoires to define a new trajectory.
T h e highly centralized, bureaucratic and rigidly ideological structure of the Turkish establishment (including the mainstream media) started countering these moves by inventing new threats to national security and instigating a wave of nationalist hysteria, lynching attempts and flag furies. Bilim, no. 109 (2007) . 86 Unlike Mexico where a single party dominated the electoral outcome over the past century, Turkey's political system accommodates a considerable degree of ideological diversity through electoral channels, even with a 10-percent national threshold. Fourteen political parties and 772 independent candidates competed against each other in the 2007 elections. Although the Left has always been the one ideology excluded from parliament owing to the lo-percent hurdle, the ultra-right and the Islamists have obtained representation alongside social democrats, liberals and republicans. The current parliament includes members belonging to four political parties, including the DTP and four independent deputies.
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£ democratic struggle was staged. Although the 23 D T P deputies were = under pressure from all sides to prove that they had no organic links z to the PKK, they eventually came to be accepted as the representatives £ of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Their having voiced "scandalous" p ideas from the parliament floor-for instance, "why should we deny £ that the P K K is a reality in this country?" 87 -has led to legal moves 2 to remove their immunity and ban the party. As opposed to the plight 3 of the H E P / D E P , however, such moves triggered considerable opposiz tion from among civil society activists. Stop Racism might actually have been expressing what a considerable portion of democrats and other progressive Turkish circles seem to be thinking: the Kurdish movement is the only major social movement in the country capable of standing at the same time against the establishment and the two other mass movements, the ultra-nationalists and the Islamists. T h e labor movement has not been able to reorganize itself after the devastating effects of the 1980 military coup. T h e prospect of an EU-incited democratization process has also dimmed, given the resistance within the EU to Turkey's full membership. Most radical democrats and left-wing intellectuals in Turkey are therefore pinning their hopes on the Kurdish movement as the only potentially democratic force available at present. They are spending a great deal of energy to establish a dialogue with renowned Kurdish figures. At times, the dialogic process turns into a monologue whereby Turks start dictating to the Kurds what they should do, like condemning all types of militarism, including the PKK's.
8 9 Notwithstanding the ups and downs, these "dialogues" have concretized in a series of peace conferences convening in six metropolises throughout Turkey from 2003 onwards and the subsequent formation of a "Peace Assembly" in 2007. Uniting the new m actors engaged in fostering a democratic resolution of the Kurdish ques-u tion, this informal assembly tries to coordinate activities aiming, among « others, at: ending armed conflict; fighting discourses that stigmatize the n "Other"; removing the institutional and legal hurdles in the way of full < participation of Kurds as "active subjects of the political arena"; devis-£ ing plans to reduce poverty and inequality in the Southeast; removing * bans on the use of the Kurdish language; and calling the mainstream » media to question its role in perpetuating an atmosphere of hatred and " mistrust. 90 T h e assembly is not an officially recognized structure, unlike the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) in Mexico, but it centralizes and institutionalizes democratization efforts. Another significant novelty in the Turkish political scene is the will to form an umbrella party (Cati Partisi) to allow several small opposition parties to join forces. A strategic alliance was already formed during the 2007 elections, whereby Kurdish and leftist parties jointly put forward independent candidates. Last but not least, as this paper was being finalized, a sudden and relatively unexpected "opening" materialized under the auspices of the ruling pro-Islamic party, the AKP, who launched a so-called "democratic initiative" that set the political scene ablaze in an effort to solve the "Kurdish problem."
As important as these parliamentary, institutional and societal developments may be, two grandiose issues were left unresolved in this process: (1) N o language other than that of poverty reduction and developmentalism was used in assessing the economic aspect of the problems in the Southeast. (2) N o language other than that of statist politics and instrumental negotiation was used in offering a solution to the Kurdish question.
To be sure, the long and painful struggle of the Kurdish movement sedimented in various discourses and practices. T h e most notable ones are debates over citizenship (replacing the word "Turk" [Turk] by"Tiirkiyeli" [of Turkey] to denote the citizens of the Turkish Republic), the right to education in the mother tongue, and the representation of minorities on state television. Apart from provoking self-reflection among Turks, the movement also played a major role in revealing the dark side of the state, particularly its contra-guerrilla and anti-terror activity. The emergence of signs of anti-militarism in a society where every man is considered a "soldier by birth" can undoubtedly be imputed to the suf- 90 Bianet, "Amas Bariji Kuracak Toplumsal Orgiitlenme," (2007) , http://www.bianet.org/bianet/insanhaklari/90221-amac-barisi-kuracak-toplumsal-orgutlenme. £ ferings caused by fifteen years of civil war. In step with the global trend, = multiculturalism (or rather an estheticized interest in minority cultures) z also became popular among the urban elite. Concrete concessions made £ by the government were the launching of a Kurdish-language televip sion channel ( T R T 6) and beginning to encourage the establishment of £ Kurdish studies in universities. * However, state authorities, elected representatives and the wider pub-9 lie still think and act through strict dichotomies such as Turk/ Kurd, terz rorist/pacifist, and threat/security. This can partially be accounted for by looking at how regional dynamics circumscribe the spaces of action available to the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The PKK, for instance, is operating in a highly volatile region, the Middle East, which has been and still is of formidable interest to imperialist powers, mainly owing to its petroleum reserves. In addition, the Middle East is particularly lacking in historical experiences of autonomy due to having long been subdued under Ottoman dominion, although endless power struggles have marked its past. In contrast, although Central America has also had its share of successive imperialist interventions, the traditional indigenous types of communal organization and the revolutionary struggles that founded modern Mexico have provided a practical and justificatory foundation to collective acts of defiance. 91 Another reason is surely the "Sevres syndrome," or the fear of dismemberment, from which large segments of Turkish society have suffered ever since the end of World War I and which politicians use and abuse at will.
As the expectation that EU membership would finally bring about democratization dimmed, it became evident that any substantial change would have to be achieved without foreign assistance, despite the abovementioned volatility of the country and the region. T h e DTP's electoral success could have been used as leverage to expand the democratic spaces already appropriated and to initiate a full-fledged grassroots movement. This has not materialized yet. In its self-critique after the 2007 elections, the D T P succinctly summarizes its lack of vision:
We could not transform the pluralist structure of the party into an asset. Rather than instigating radical democracy by ourselves, as we should have done, we were stuck in the position of complaining about why the state does not democratize itself. Caught up in the very power structures that they are seeking to alter, ™ the groups in the present Kurdish movement are in a way reinforcing • < > the centrality of the state as the sole decision-making and resource-S distributing mechanism. They still continue to employ the discourse ™ of "sides" (Turkish and Kurdish, the state and the P K K ) , for instance. < Several actors, including the DTP, offer to serve as intermediaries. This £ reproduces the idea of a split society, instead of rendering the conceptual * boundaries more fluid and porous. T h e general discourse is one of fea-*> sibility, political pragmatism and party-based politics. Petitions, public " demonstrations and closed conferences or workshops among elites are about the only forms of political action devised by the movement. Little or no alliance exists between the Kurdish movement and other minorities living in Turkey. 93 The "Edi Bes e" campaign, obviously instigated by the P K K leadership, has adopted the Zapatista slogan "Ya Basta" (enough), but only to ask for the liberation of Ocalan.
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Moreover, there is absolutely no effort, either on the part of the Kurdish elite or of the civic organizations which are part of the movement, to counter the effects of the neoliberal transformation. For instance, Diyarbakir has become a base for lucrative undertakings and projects for the private sector. There abound micro-credit schemes that tend to discipline an economically desperate population in accordance with the necessities of the neoliberal market economy. Infrastructural projects and arrangements related to the needs of forced migrants, projects to provide for a return to the villages, economic and industrial concerns, poverty, illiteracy, women's problems, and health are biopolitical problems that no one feels the need to address in novel, participatory or communitary ways. T h e ultimate purveyor of livelihood and employment is still thought to be the state. Instead of using violence and intimidation, the latter is more and more subscribing to governmental schemes likely to bring about subjugation through subtle disciplinary practices and through the development of consumption culture. N o alternative sustainable agricultural vision is being discussed to struggle against the neoliberal onslaught on the farming sector.
Thus, the coordinated efforts described above remain at best elitist and at worst unable to detach themselves from a state-centered idea of 93 Ahmet Turk, the leader of the DTP, did not refrain from distinguishing the Kurds from other minorities on the grounds that the "15 million Kurds living on these lands for 4,000 years are one of the two peoples who form the main pillars of the Turkish Republic. £ justice and democratization. Unlike the Zapatistas, the new Kurdish = -cwm-democratization movement is devoid of an alternative political * and economic imaginary.
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p The Zapatista/autonomy movement £ W h a t distinguishes the Zapatistas from the Kurdish movement is ul-£ timately the former's refusal to abide by either liberalism or neoliberal-3 ism. As described above, the Zapatistas' alternative political vision has z led them to develop a much broader concept and practice of democracy. Representative democracy, however liberal it may be, is not sufficient in the eyes of the E Z L N : " T h e Zapatista concept of democracy is something that is built from below, with everyone, even those who think differently from us. Democracy is the exercise of power for the people all the time and in all places." 95 The various elections boycotted by the E Z L N have caused considerable frustration for the opposition party P R D . Nevertheless, the E Z L N ' s refusal to be'Yepresentative" of a faction within Mexican society stems from the conviction that current political structures, rather than being solutions, are responsible for creating the problems facing the poor, the excluded and marginalized, the oppressed and exploited. This partially explains why the Left keeps a skeptic eye on the Zapatista experience. Instead of aiming to take over state power and use it for revolutionary ends, the EZLN's grand ambition is to change the very structures of power-including those of economic power. Using them would in fact amount to justifying them. T h e Zapatistas' idea of struggle involves revolutionizing power right here and now. In other words, the means are made to conform to the desired end. One close observer of the movement has commented that the Zapatistas' political vision is a "modern proposal that, like a group of small particules, evades the capturing nets tendered by the ancien regime, concentrating anew on the subtleties involved in seeking attunement between 'the popular' (lo popular) and'the legitimate' (lo legitimo)!'
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T h e communiques of the E Z L N that circulate on the internet contain ample rhetorical evidence as to the movement's anti-neoliberal stance. But how much has actually changed on the ground remains to be assessed.
As opposed to the PKK, the E Z L N has had an international appeal from the beginning. It did not restrict its request to a particular social or ethnic group; it claimed to be embracing the cause of all oppressed ™ groups and classes, not only in Mexico, but everywhere. T h e basic de--o mands it made-freedom, justice, democracy, dignity-were so general 5 that they simply invited identification with and espousal of the cause.
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The use of the internet and of press releases and open letters by the < E Z L N , besides earning them the epitaph of "postmodern revolution-£ aries," was an ingenious strategy to spread the movement beyond the * confines of Chiapas. Some interest in the plight of the indigenous in » Latin America had already been aroused by massive mobilizations that 5 protested the celebration of the 500 anniversary of Columbus's "discovery" of the Americas. 98 Building upon this newly acquired terrain, the Zapatistas managed to secure the support of thousands in as few as a fortnight. O n 12 January 1994, about 100,000 people gathered in Mexico City's Zocalo to prevent the army from crushing the rebellion. Marcos's pleas to what he termed "civil society" are both an indication of how much the poorly armed forces of the E Z L N depended on this "outside" support and of how this very interpellation created the "civil society" that Marcos needed.
This is a perfect example of'jumping scales," as much as of extending the movement's network beyond its immediate locality. As Bosco has argued in the case of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, these connections help "tap into other networks located elsewhere to obtain critical resources that were locally unavailable to them." 99 While these connections were more virtual than actual, the international encuentros organized periodically by the Zapatistas from 1996 onwards moved the scale up: physical connections were thus established between the regional (Chiapas) and the global (mainly Latin America, but also Europe and Southeast Asia).
T h e espousal of the Zapatista cause by activists and collectivities elsewhere in the world indicates that it has become an example, a model that captures the imagination of all sorts of people across different geographies and cultures. As Couch has effectively shown, the anti-globalization movement has been much influenced by this example. focation in the very physical place that it constructed, irrespective of the symbolic and associative space it might continue to occupy globally.
Apart from peace caravans and symbolic marches, one of the more concrete differences the Zapatistas made in the Mexican political scene was the "National Consultation for the Recognition of the Rights of Indian Peoples and Against the War of Extermination" in 1999. This was the first-ever independent national indigenous organization in the history of Mexico. More than three million people participated in the Consulta in Mexico and several parallel consultations took place among Mexican nationals in the U S . This had "the effect of modeling participatory democracy at the national (and transnational) level, and puncturing the military and information siege of Chiapas."
103 Faithful to their philosophy of "leading by obeying," the E Z L N has in fact organized several consultations of this sort with civil society. It is therefore possible to claim that the Zapatistas have left an organizational legacy that has been imitated by other groups struggling in different contexts. O n a more legal level, the San Andres Accords provides a basis upon which to pursue demands, although the implementation process has been full of "legislative tinkering," 1 falling significantly short of responding to the demands made by indigenous communities. T h e lack of political will in regard to the recognition of indigenous cultural and land rights cannot be fully grasped without taking into consideration the economic stakes involved in it. As Higgins points out:
T h e significance of a neo-liberal governmentality as a challenge to any process of peace in Mexico cannot be overestimated. In terms of neoliberalism, the Cocopa's [the Commission for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas, a multiparty legislative body] proposed law effectively represented a means of protectionism for Mexico's indigenous peoples. It attempted to provide both the legal and practical mechanisms by which indigenous culture might not only continue to survive but perhaps even flourish-and in doing so it also placed limits on the capacity of investors and private corporations to take advantage of Mexico's resources, both human and material. £ T h e E Z L N had at the onset linked political with economic issues. The = 1992 repeal of land reform legislation was "the straw that broke the z camel's back." 106 In fact, Chiapas had been excluded from the revolu-£ tionary land distribution scheme instigated in 1917. When, at last, land p was accorded to the indigenous populations in the region in the 1930s, £ this was mainly the worst plots of land on steep slopes. While ladino 2 ranchers held enormous plots, the indigenous in Los Altos had to be 3 settled in the lowland Lacandon jungle, owing to an explosion of deal mand for land. 107 As Nick Henck has convincingly argued, there was no need to cajole the local population into joining an armed uprising, since the campesinos needed urgent protection against the violence of powerful landlords.
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According to Tariq Ali, however, the Zapatista philosophy to "change the world without taking power" is nothing but a "moral slogan" that fails to generate concrete gains because it does not threaten patterns of domination. 109 The Plan Puebla-Panama, likened by a Zapatista farmer to a "cold war [...] a war of low prices, so that we die off," 110 still hovers above the region as a mighty state-backed neoliberal scheme of privatization and exploitation. But considering the sedimentation process, it is a mistake to claim that no concrete gains were made. The idea that there is a lack of contact between labor unions and the Zapatistas, for instance, overlooks the impact that the E Z L N had on union leaders. As one study on independent unions in Mexico has revealed, there were encounters between workers and E Z L N members. In the words of one unionist, About a year ago there was a beautiful encounter between the workers and the indigenous of the Zapatista army [...] . From that encounter we have formed really strong bonds between their army and our union, solidarity has even grown from that day. We have sent fellow workers to give the Zapatistas the service of electricity, we do it on our own, we take the cables and the generators and everything they need and leave them there so that they can have electricity. 111 Furthermore, the Zapatista approach to doing politics through grass-™ roots consultations and respect for divergence of opinion has had an -° effect on decision-making in previously hierarchical organizations. To 5 cite a union leader once again: n < We're trying to listen more to each other and that change has not £ been made from one day to another, it's a process of change. Most of * the independent unions, for example, are now fighting for the San » Andres Accords as well as for their own needs and demands, so now " we share demands. It is possible to assert that the experience of autonomy has had a considerable impact on the lives of the indigenous population in Zapatista territory in Chiapas. Hospitals and schools have been erected where none were available previously. According to a Zapatista spokesperson at the Third Intergalactic Encuentro in July of 2007, the construction of a school in the Caracol of Oventic provoked the government to build two in nearby villages: "But there are either no teachers in those schools or they are too drunk to teach."
The communities choose what they consider important to teach to children (mathematics, indigenous language and culture, history of the community and natural sciences in Roberto Barrios, for example). Nobody fails any class because every student is considered to have his/her own rhythm of learning. The Zapatistas have replaced grading with more communitarian forms of evaluation: "We don't use grades because nobody knows more or less than anybody else." Trainees called promotores have been educated in seminars or workshops to serve in Zapatista clinics and schools. These have not been funded by the Mexican government, but rather by Zapatista solidarity groups in Europe. A much-needed vaccination program is underway. Another problem that the communities have learnt to deal with is the disposal of human waste. Each munkipio has commissions for health, education, agriculture, justice and treasury. Locals proudly point to die latrines they have installed in the Caracoles (which served over 2,000 people this summer at Oventic) and reflect upon ways to utilize excrement as fertilizers. Much land has been confiscated from ranchers. A civil registrars office has also been set up in the communities to register newborn babies, since the government was not doing its job. In short, the communities affirm that they are"learning by doing" (aprendiendo en practicando).
In fact, the need for pooling resources has also given rise to a series of feminist practices: women participate fully in the production and mar-£ keting process and have a say in how the income is spent. They have = voiced their concerns over the abuse of alcohol, for instance. N o t only z were their husbands wasting hard-earned money, but they were also E beating their wives when drunk. This is why alcohol is forbidden in p Zapatista-controlled territories. The Zapatistas have also promulgated £ a Revolutionary Women's Law that gives the women the right to choose 5 their partner and decide their number of children.
113 O n another front, s on the traditional shirts embroidered and sold by Zapatista women's z cooperatives, a label mentions the name of the producer and the hours she spent on the shirt. This is clearly an anti-capitalist practice that significantly reduces what Marx has called "commodity fetishism."
In short, the Zapatista movement has shifted from the spectacular to the everyday. T h e space it has acquired in the domestic political arena in Mexico certainly does not match its enduring impact on activists elsewhere. But the E Z L N was confronted with relative inertia during the Other Campaign, which intended to tour Mexico to unite the oppressed in a nation-wide movement. T h e Zapatistas have now turned "inward," so to speak, to tend to the realization of autonomy. One commentator sees this as the sign of the Zapatista's failure to adapt: "Radical refusal of any engagement with the neoliberal state gains transformative traction to the extent that it simultaneously articulates, symbolically and in daily political practice, with those who struggle from other sociopolitical locations." 114 T h e potential for forging such articulations seems weak indeed, for the Mexican governments full-fledged neoliberal strategy finds little resistance in places other than Chiapas.
In lieu of a conclusion Both the Kurdish movement and the Zapatistas are under the assault of the discourse of "necessity"-the discourse of the necessity of privatization, derealization, commodification, or the discourse of the necessity of national security, personal security, urban security, and so on. Military operations are still an option in southeastern Turkey, while paramilitary operations have heightened in Chiapas. But a more cunning strategy for
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subjugating the local population is also taking place through neoliberal g agricultural and social policies. N G O s are part and parcel of this process -o in Turkey. While the Zapatistas have succeeded in establishing control 5 over N G O activity in Chiapas, multinationals are vying over the region £ to take a hold of natural resources, such as lumber and water. < Without doubt, the Kurdish movement can be said to have altered £ both Turkish politics and the lives of Kurds in Turkey. If hardliners do * not intervene in the present political process, there is a strong likelihood = that Kurdish identity will eventually be "normalized." This would proba-™ bly democratize the legal and cultural structures in the country, replacing former norms and imaginaries with less rigidly defined ones. A domino effect would then be launched whereby other identities (Armenian, Jewish, Arabic) and beliefs (Alevi, Yezidi) would also be liberated. In this optimistic scenario, Turkey would become a genuine liberal democracy and even be accepted into the EU.
But, even if all this happens, what are the prospects for halting the evacuation of the countryside under the impact of neoliberal reforms? W h a t would be available as a source of income for Kurdish peasants in the Southeast, other than the micro-credit scheme already offered? How would this obstruct the "cleaning up" of neighborhoods adjacent to Diyarbakir's ancient walls with the aim of making the city a tourist attraction? W h o would guarantee a decent future to the inhabitants of those neighborhoods, most of them populated by migrants whom the army has driven out of their villages? "Where does Diyarbakir end and where does Istanbul begin?," as one local activist asked. W h a t social mechanism would alter the fate of Kurdish migrants' children who are sent to large cities in western Turkey to collect garbage? As a matter of fact, how would these self-assigned garbage collectors be protected against multinationals that collaborate with municipalities to throw them out of the waste industry, which has revealed itself to be a very lucrative one? W h o will represent any of these excluded, marginalized, stigmatized? Through which political channels would they be able to express their voices? W h o or what could save them from being rendered invisible via urban planning and other gentrification schemes? And, if no right answer may be found to such questions, will the "Kurdish problem" have been solved?
These and many other questions blur the assessment criteria in such a way as to make one wonder whether any social movement could actually enhance grassroots democracy without having an alternative political and economic vision. The Zapatistas might as well fail to form a nation-wide alliance and suffocate within a physical place. But what of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005379 would then remain is Zapatismo, a philosophy and method of struggle. Such movements as the Zapatistas are distinguishable in part by their capacity to recognise and act creatively upon connections among structures, processes and peoples that do not enter significantly into the calculations of conventional political actors [...] not only in struggles around specific problems but also in struggles that recognise the emancipatory potential inherent in certain kinds of connections and solidarities. 115 Indeed, the space that Zapatismo has opened in imaginaries elsewhere than in Mexico is what made this study possible.
